Abstract: To reduce errors in projects, knowledge about their causes, through examining their chain of events, and costs should be made available. With this in mind, this paper examines the role of the error recovery process in detecting human-related errors with reference to seven Swedish building construction projects. A total of 2,879 human errors were identified, and those that were found to be the most costly were examined in detail. Industry practitioners' opinions as to how the identified errors could have been prevented were solicited. It was revealed that the major areas of error reduction lay with improving communication between participants, introducing incentives, improving resourcing levels in projects particularly during design, and the encouragement of individual and organizational learning. The paper concludes by suggesting that the most effective learning takes place in projects when the entire error-recovery process is performed ͑i.e., detection, indication, and correction͒ and not parts thereof.
Introduction
Efforts to reduce failures in construction projects by studying their causes have led to a meaningful reduction in their occurrence ͑Yates and Lockley 2002͒. The main cause of failures in construction can be attributed to human error ͑Porteous 1992; Josephson 1994; Lockley 1998; Georgiou 2000͒ , which often occurs due to poor managerial practices ͑Love 2001; Josephson 2002͒. Although the causal attribute of human error has become a leitmotiv in the literature, its detection during its formative stages of development have been considered difficult to ascertain ͑Love 2001; Josephson and Larsson 2001͒ . This is because errors typically reside within the processes of individual firms, i.e., the design process and the interfaces between design team members ͑Love 2002a; Love and Sohal 2002͒ . Moreover, there is often a time delay as well as a change in organizational location before the symptom, such as a dimensional error in a drawing, is identified. Consequently, effort and time are expended in attempting to correct the specific symptom. Yet, the processes that generated the error͑s͒ can continue to create additional problems that appear later ͑Cooper 1993; Love et al. 2000a have a significant effect on project schedule, as well as the morale and motivation of project participants ͑Love 2002a͒.
A plethora of human errors made in construction projects have been reported in the popular press due to the adverse consequences that have arisen from their occurrence. For example, in the Göteborgs-Posten, a Swedish newspaper, the following headline was reported ''Painful error in the tunnel project.'' It was reported that a data input error resulted in a section of the Chalmers tunnel not following its intended profile. As a result, a deviation of 2.5 m occurred in the tunnel. It was noted in this particular case that an error occurred during data entry and early detection could have had saved a significant amount of time and cost to the project. Such simple errors have been identified as being the main contributors to major failures in projects ͑Kaminetzky 1991͒, yet, if they had been detected earlier, significant cost savings and in some instances human lives could have been saved.
Errors can be essentially avoided by eliminating root causes using techniques embedded with the philosophy of total quality management ͑TQM͒, for example, benchmarking, root cause analysis, and failure mode effect analysis ͑FMEA͒ ͑Love et al. 1999a; Love et al. 2000b͒ . The use of such techniques can be used to enable learning to occur and, therefore, can contribute to errors recurring in future projects. In addition, research undertaken by Love and Sohal ͑2002͒ in Australia and Kululanga et al. ͑2001͒ in the United Kingdom has revealed that construction organizations tend to have a low-moderate learning capability, which can also contribute to the recurrence of errors. Even when organizations collect data, it is not transformed into information, and, therefore, lessons are not learned ͑McMaster 2000͒. Frequently, this is because the next bid and project become pressing and too urgent, and, as such, no time is allowed for reflection, which is a critical part of the learning process ͑McMaster 2000͒. In some instances, the pressures of delivering projects within budget and to schedule can lead to ''amnesia'' being experienced. Evidence of this can be found when designers repeatedly produce design documentation containing dimensional errors and omissions ͑Tilley and Barton 1997; Love et al. 1999b; Tilley and McFallen 2000͒ or when contractors fail to provide adequate project resources as they attempt to reduce preliminary costs and maximize their margin. For organizations to learn how to reduce errors, knowledge about their causes, through examining their chain of events, and costs should be made available. With this in mind, the role of the error recovery process in seven Swedish building construction projects is analyzed and discussed. The costs associated with the early detection and late recovery of human errors is identified during the production process.
Error Definition
Errors are in the realm of intangibles: only human action can be erroneous, and actions, as well as inaction, are not abstract notions ͑Hurst et al. 1991; Stewart 1993; Busby 2001͒. Wantanakorn et al. ͑1999, p. 113͒ suggested that it is difficult to provide a general definition of error, although it is ''straightforward to recognize some actions such as omissions, miscalculations or misinterpretations as erroneous.'' An error involves an element of individual culpability, which involves a series of discrete events ͑e.g., incorrect choice, omission͒ and are associated with a direct magnitude ͑e.g., size of error͒ or a magnitude associated with its effect ͑e.g., cost͒ ͑Melchers 1989͒. For example, Hagan and Mays ͑1981, p. 339͒ defined human error as ''a failure of the human to do a designed task within specified limits of exactness, sequence or time.'' This definition is ambiguous inasmuch as it is impossible to determine what is meant by exactness, and the sequencing and timing of activities can vary without causing error or being erroneous. Bea ͑1994͒ defines human error as ''a departure from acceptable or desired practice on part of an individual that can result in unacceptable or undesired results.'' Although these definitions are succinct, it is difficult to determine an acceptable standard of practice unless a specific reference is made to charters provided by professional bodies.
Knocke ͑1992, p. 32͒ defines an error and omission as ''any departure from correct construction ͑including checking and supervision͒ technical inspection; and absence of adequate instructions for maintenance and operation of the building.'' Reason ͑1990, p. 9͒ describes human error in psychological terms as ''all those occasions on which a planned sequence of mental or physical activities did not follow as intended if that sequence of plan could proceed, it failed to achieve its desired outcome.'' Implicitly, there are difficulties in objectively interpreting the ''mental or physical'' activities of people thus determining if they were the cause of the error. In fact, it is a matter of contention whether individuals can justifiably be blamed for all errors, as making mistakes is seen to be an innate of human nature ͑Reason 1990͒. According to Kaminetzky ͑1991͒, a clear distinction should be made between human and technological error, as technology may fail in certain environmental circumstances or simply fail because of ''the normal process of deterioration.'' Bearing this in mind, error is defined as a ''deviation from what is intended and caused by human actions'' for the purposes of this paper.
Error Chains
Matousek ͑1985͒ and Josephson ͑1994͒ have proffered that there is an explicit relationship between the causes and consequences of errors; both authors present this relationship as a ''chain of events.'' These chains include causes, human error, defect, consequences, and corrective measures, as noted in Fig. 1 .
The way that an error is handled after it has been manifested strongly influences the error cost that occurs. For example, shortcomings in inspection procedures on-site and neglecting to correct defects may exacerbate the consequences of the defect. Learning is an implicit function of the chain of events model, so, when an error is detected the necessary steps are put in place to make sure that the error is not repeated. Within this model, Josephson ͑1994͒ suggests that single-and double-loop learning can take place.
Single-loop learning involves thermostat-like adjustments in response to error detection ͑Argyris and Schön, 1978͒. Members of an organization respond to changes in their environment by detecting errors and correcting them but still maintaining existing organizational norms, that is, no questioning of the original objective occurs and present policies and goals are preserved in virtually unchanged forms. Essentially, this level of learning does not encourage or result in any reflection or inquiry. Dodgson ͑1993͒ equates single-loop learning to activities that add to the knowledge base, competencies, or routines without actually altering the fundamental nature of the organization's activities. For example, a contractor who regularly undertakes design and construct projects may repeatedly incur additional costs due to design errors for particular trade types and may use this knowledge and the experiences gained to include a contingency in future contracts for potential design errors. Continuing with such a practice in the short-term may be profitable, but in the long-term this action may have detrimental effects on the contractor's ability to deliver projects to their client's satisfaction. Double-loop learning, on the other hand, occurs when errors are detected and corrected in a manner that modifies an organization's implicit norms and objectives. Organizational conflict is often a correlate of double-loop learning inasmuch as the status quo is challenged. Double-loop learning leads to the development of creativity in the problem solving process, which Argyris and Schön ͑1978͒ refer to as ''deutro-learning,'' that is, learning about learning. This type of learning involves the modification of organizational culture, policies, objectives, strategies, and structure. Considering current work practices, many construction organizations may have difficulty with this type of learning because it requires them to break away from existing norms and value systems ͑Kululanga et al. Love and Sohal 2002͒. The causes of errors are often difficult to determine because there can be several apparent causes for the same erroneous action ͑Wilson et al. 1993͒. However, the term ''root cause'' is used to describe the most basic reason for an undesirable condition, as noted in Fig. 2 ͑Wilson et al. 1993͒ . If the root cause is eliminated or corrected, then the recurrence of the error can be prevented. It is noteworthy that apparent causes and the root cause may exist at the individual, project, or organizational level, and, as a result, intra-and interorganizational cooperation is required if errors are to be prevented ͑Love et al. 1999b͒.
In a chain of events model, several causes and consequences may be experienced, but only a single primary human error and primary defect ͑the outcome of the error͒ can be identified ͑Jo-sephson 1994͒. If the primary error or primary defect are not detected, then further actions are required. Such actions are referred to as secondary errors. In Fig. 3 , an example of an error chain is illustrated for a metal door, which had to be exchanged. In this example, the human error arose from a person who did not recognize the users' requirements, which led to the wrong doors being ordered ͑Josephson 1994͒.
The calculation of error costs has received widespread attention ͑e.g., Davis et al. 1989; Burati et al. 1992; Josephson and Hammarlund 1999; Barber et al. 2000; Hall and Tomkins 2001; Love 2002b͒ . Differences in definition have resulted in a range of costs being reported. For example, Josephson and Hammarlund ͑1999͒ reported that defect costs ͑that included only errors͒ ranged from 2 to 9% of production costs; whereas, Burati et al. ͑1992͒ have reported quality deviations ͑which included errors, omission and changes͒ of 12.4% of total project costs. However, until there is a degree of consistency in definition and the calculation of errors reported, costs should not be considered to be indicative but only used as a source of reference ͑Gluch and Josephson 1999͒. In the chain events model, the direct costs of an error include only those associated with undertaking the actual corrective measure. The costs for delays are only included if they can be traced back to a specific defect.
Error-Recovery Process
Sasou and Reason ͑1999͒ state that the error recovery process consists of three stages: detection, indication, and correction. They suggest that the first step in recovering errors is to detect their occurrence. Once detected, the recovery of an error will depend on whether it is brought to the attention of the person who is responsible for its correction. An error that is detected, but not identified, may not necessarily be recovered, and actions based on these errors are likely to be executed. The last step is the actual correction of errors. If the error is not corrected, the actions based on the error will remain unchecked. The longer it takes to detect the error the higher will be its costs of correction. This may inhibit learning because the cause͑s͒ of the error are more difficult to analyze and determine why it occurred. Josephson ͑1994͒ and Love ͑2001͒ have suggested that many errors that occur during the production process should be detected before activities commence, but poor planning, the lack of knowledge and experience of personnel, and lack of attention to quality management procedures often result in errors going undetected until a problem arises.
Learning and Error-Recovery Process
Members in an organization react to changes in its inner and outer environments through detecting defects. Most often this only leads to revisions to workflow. Consequently, the organization preserves its mental models-cognitive inner structures, which consist of the individual's fundamental assumptions of the reality, unmodified ͑Senge 1990͒. In some situations, defects are detected that require the organization to modify its shared mental models. In a construction project, participants' double membership implies that the action influences two such shared mental models, those in the parent and the project organization.
The most effective learning takes place when the entire errorrecovery process ͑i.e., detection, indication and correction͒ is performed ͑Josephson 1994͒. However, this can be an arduous task due to the differentiated and fragmented nature of construction. An individuals' knowledge is typically limited to their own activities, which can contribute to their inability to detect errors. In addition, people's experiences differ, and, therefore, they may interpret situations ͑errors͒ in different ways as they seize upon different stimuli innate within their own mental model, which influences their ability to reflect. Project team members often develop their own objectives, goals, and value systems. Often project team members become so dedicated to the optimization of their own function they are unable to identify errors that have occurred by others or possibly by themselves.
Stress, caused by the pressures of time constraints, may result in project participants acting on the basis of their own wellknown shared mental models instead of the shared mental model of the project. An individual's memory has limited capacity, and all information fed back about the project, specifically errors, cannot be stored in their memory ͑March and Simon 1993͒. Situations in which stress occurs can often be related to situations in which defects are detected and corrected. Correction of defects is often prioritized before learning ͑Josephson 1994͒. An individual needs time to reflect on their experience and be able to store and convert data to information for further use.
Research Method
To examine the error recovery process in detail required a research method that could encapsulate the actions and behavior of people. A natural and obvious technique is to watch what they do, record what is noticed, and then describe, analyze, and interpret what has been observed ͑Robson 1993͒. Observation can be used to comprehend complex issues, as well as ask questions to seek clarification on certain issues ͑Sekaran 1992͒. Observation is more than just ''looking'' as noted by Robson ͑1993͒ who states that it • Serves a specified research purpose; • Is planned systematically; • Is recorded systematically and related to more propositions rather than simply being presented as an interesting set of curiosities; and • Is subjected to checks and controls on validity and reliability Unstructured, nonparticipant observation ͑Miller and Crabbtree 1992͒ was used as the primary source of data collection to identify errors on-site and to obtain a ''real life'' view of site management and subcontractors' experiences and attitudes toward error detection and prevention. The observer regularly walked around the site to identify errors and observe their rectification. With the permission of the contractor and subcontractors, photographs were taken of the unsatisfactory work. While the subcontractors were being observed, their viewpoints about rectifying the problem were noted ͑Table 1͒.
Data Collection
Seven observers were educated in error collection and cause analysis and were placed at one of the selected project sites for a period of 4 to 6 months. By making site rounds, the observers were in daily contact with all site personnel, including subcontractors. Occasionally the observers communicated with clients, designers, and material manufacturers about errors that were identified. The observers took part in site meetings and had access to contract documentation. Each error was registered and described with codes and free text. One code considered the possibility of detecting the error at an earlier stage and was subsequently judged by the personnel involved in the specific error. For each error identified, drawings, sketches, and other relevant documents associated with the error were copied and attached to the error descriptions for further analyses. A definition of error types used in the research can be seen in Table 2 .
Findings
A total 2,879 errors were identified, analyzed, and documented. The number of errors corresponds to approximately four errors per day, which the observers considered to be the maximum number of errors possible to identify, follow-up, analyze, and describe in 1 day. Table 3 identifies those project participants who were deemed to be responsible for initiating errors in the selected projects.
Errors and their associated costs were found to follow the well-known Pareto principle, i.e., a few errors caused a significant amount of incurred costs. With this in mind, 10% of the most expensive errors, which represented 66% of the total error costs incurred, were chosen for a special analysis of error detection. Because 2,879 errors were identified, 288 were used for the analysis. However, 42 of these were excluded because they were not fully described, were unsuitable for analysis ͑accidents and thefts͒, or they included several minor errors.
Four experts, an architect, a structural designer, and two contractors, were involved in the analysis of the remaining 246 er- a Error cost is in percentage of project cost for the 6 months the projects were followed up. b Project was followed during 4 months, i.e., the whole production stage. Errors that can be traced back to other people or organizations, e.g., damages and thefts by third persons, and errors with unknown causes a In some analyses, due to different project organizations, the subcontractor errors are divided into management errors and workmanship errors and then included in production management errors and workmanship errors. b This group of errors is excluded from most analysis in this paper.
rors. These professionals had 15 to 30 years of work experience in their respective fields of expertise. An initial group discussion, lead by one of the researchers, on three errors of different types was organized to find an appropriate level of analyses. The experts then individually analyzed 50 to 120 errors each, according to their field of expertise. For example, all errors associated with architects were given to the architect. This choice can be questioned, because participants often tend to not see their own mistakes and blame other actors. For that reason, 30 errors of different types were given to at least two experts to test reliability and validity. For each error, four questions were asked: 1. When should the error have been detected? 2. Who should have detected the error? 3. What was needed to detect the error? 4. What would the errors cost have been if the error had been detected at this time? Because error chains may include several events and participants, they may be possible to determine reasons why it occurred.
Early Detection
It was revealed that 37% of all errors should have been detected earlier, and 35% could possibly have been detected earlier ͑Table 4͒. It was noteworthy that observers estimated that only 60 to 90% of all errors were detected in the study. Almost 50% of client errors that were identified could not have been detected earlier.
All the practitioners that were interviewed indicated that most design errors could have been detected by inspecting the design documentation. It was revealed that 90% of design errors could have been identified before construction commenced on-site. Likewise, it was suggested 80% of the production management errors could have been detected earlier, albeit prior to the commencement of the activity, as many were due to poor planning and work preparation.
Errors traced back to the subcontractors include both management errors and workmanship errors. Almost 80% of these errors could have been detected earlier. Similarly, 60% of materials delivered to the site were damaged during the manufacturing process and should have been identified prior to their delivery. Approximately 50% of errors that were identified were attributable to machinery failures. Many of these had to do with lack of maintenance. For this reason, problems with individual machines were judged to be more difficult to detect. It is suggested that the earlier in the process the error chain commences the easier it is to successfully detect and correct errors. However, client errors and machine errors are exceptions to this rule, although only a small number of errors of this type were identified in the research reported in this paper.
Errors were also classified in accordance with building elements ͑Table 5͒. Most errors were found to occur in the building's structure and in the installations. Most installation errors were due to clashes between ventilation and sewerage pipework. Such clashes could have been prevented if an effective design coordination procedure had been followed.
Who Should Detect Human Errors Earlier?
A significant number of human errors that occurred were found to have error chains. This means that there were several occasions where different project participants could have identified and prevented errors from occurring. It was suggested that production managers ͑also known as construction site managers͒ and designers could have detected a significant proportion of the errors that were identified ͑Table 6͒. It was further suggested that construction workers, including subcontractors, could have detected the errors in 17% of the incidents.
What is Needed to Detect Human Errors Earlier?
More than 150 different suggestions were made regarding what was needed to enable the detection of human errors. These suggestions have been classified into four major groups: developing individual characteristics, improving specific activities, establishing routines, and providing resources ͑Table 7͒. 1. Developing individual characteristics. The individual has a crucial role in detecting human errors in specific situations. In 38% of all situations, individual characteristics such as knowledge, experience, understanding, and motivation were judged to be the ''how to.'' • Knowledge, experience, and understanding. Knowledge is gained by reading or communicating with other people. A  22  48  149  69  83  39  15  29  454  B  9  174  64  45  71  44  13  21  441  C  11  90  54  36  119  37  4  20  371  D  1  65  65  129  25  73  14  4  376  E  32  103  24  16  52  44  4  8  283  F  13  109  89  97  74  44  41  7  474  G  38  54  90  44  167  33  18  36  480  All  126  643  535  436  591  314  109  125 2,879 Experience is gained by doing the tasks over an extensive period of time. Such experience, it was suggested, would provide a greater appreciation of how different work methods function in reality. Understanding relates to how things relate to each other.
• Motivation is a complex characteristic, which also includes expectance and commitment. Several suggestions related to motivation were made. For example, it was described as a wish to contribute and to be energetic, as being careful, and having a feeling for order and a quality-minded approach. It was also described in terms of attention, being attentive, observant, alert during specific moments and, in terms of thoughtfulness, reflecting, thinking critically, and questioning. 2. Improving activities. The second major group of ''how to'' takes into account that the specific activities should have been done or should have been done more accurately. It was suggested that cooperation, planning and preparation work, and inspection could have prevented 40% of all errors.
• Cooperation between all project participants concerning drawings and contract documents.
• Planning and preparing work is a key activity of production managers but also for designers. Planning includes, checking time of delivery and checking basic information for design. Preparing the work includes taking out all requirements and examining drawings before starting a new task. This category also includes investigation, consequence analysis, securing, and testing.
• Inspection by all participants of norms, laws, drawings, specifications, function, and time. Inspection of material deliveries was often mentioned, referring to both inspection by the suppliers when loading and inspection by the contractors when unloading the material. The experts suggested that individuals, in many cases, should have inspected the result of their own work. 3. Establishing routines. Some 40 human errors could have been detected earlier if work instructions and routines had been established or if design drawings, particularly plans or extra drawings, had been made.
• Work instructions to determine the extent of work to be undertaken.
• Routines for contract review, routines for inspection, and routines for controlling documents. In three cases, the error would have been detected if the manager had made certain plans.
• Design drawings with more detail, for example creating extra drawings that explain solutions more clearly. 4. Providing resources. The expert panel suggested that more than 50 of the most costly errors could have been detected 7  44  6  0  1  0  58  Plan, prepare work  9  19  41  15  7  2  93  Inspect  3  20  35  13  18  1  90  Routines  Work descriptions  1  2  7  4  3  0  17  Routines  0  0  9  0  3  0  12  Design drawings  1  13  4  3  2  0  23  Organization  Resources  3  20  8  1  0  1  33  Information  5  5  10  9  1  1  31  Other  4  2  2  1  0  0  9  Total  45  180  198  98  53  13  587 earlier if individuals had been provided with sufficient resources and information.
• The perceived need for more resources was most common for designers, but also for production managers and clients. These include time, cost, machines, and equipment, i.e., time to inspect, time to acquire knowledge about the users' needs, the ability to follow up on the consequences of the design, and the ability to plan production in greater detail.
• Information concerns all actors. It includes information and instructions concerning the end result of a specific activity or the entire project.
Error Indication
The observers' role was to collect information from all project participants, that is, each individual project member was asked to report every single error to the observer as it was identified. Table  8 indicates which employees from the main contractor and subcontractors reported errors to the observers. Because of the method used in the study, clients and designers reported few errors, probably because they were unwillingly to identify errors that would have infered that they could be responsible for their occurrence. Interestingly, the observers found 16% of the errors themselves. They found some errors on drawings and others in the product that had been installed.
Error Correction
Only 79% of the errors that were identified were rectified, 17% were partly corrected, and 4% of the errors were left without any corrective measures at all. In most cases, the client decided to not correct them, as it was deemed that their rectification could delay the project. The percentage of fully corrected errors varied from 57 to 96% for single projects. In the building projects that obtained the lowest and highest error costs, 77% of the errors were not corrected. Some 40% of the design errors and 38% of the client errors were not fully corrected ͑Table 9͒. The main reason is that these errors had the longest error chains, that is, these errors are the most difficult and costly to rectify. No differences were found between different project types and contract forms with respect to error correction, a finding that has also been reported by Love ͑2002a͒. However, minor differences were found between single elements of building, which were primarily attributable to installation ͑Table 10͒.
Cost Reduction
Most errors are detected, indicated, and corrected after the primary human error in the chain has occurred. Thus, most errors have low costs for correction. This particular study focused on the most expensive errors and their error chains. Most of these chains consisted of up to 10 human actions after the primary error had been identified. In reality, however, it is not possible to detect all primary human errors and their associated defects. Some error chains can be more readily detected after the second or third human error. In the analysis the experts identified the stage where the error chain could have been broken ͑i.e., detected, indicated, and corrected͒. Based on their judgements, it is suggested that error costs could be reduced by as much as 62% with better management systems for error recovery. With optimal error recovery, it is suggested that the cost for the 51% most expensive errors could have been reduced by 80%, and the cost for the 72% most expensive errors could have been reduced by as much as 50%. An analysis of specific error chains indicates that the cost to correct them increases by a factor of two for each new link in the chain before it is recovered. This trend emphasizes the importance of effective error recovery. Table 11 indicates that the greatest cost reduction could have been attributable to the minimization of material related errors. Such errors often result in scrap ͑i.e., material waste͒ or returning material to the supplier for correction. It was suggested that subcontractor errors could be reduced by 70%, because almost half of these errors could have been identified earlier. It is noteworthy that the cost for the contractors' production management errors and design errors could be reduced by 65%. In particular, design errors could be detected prior to the commencement of activity on-site, and this would be a relatively inexpensive exercise because often it only requires modifications to drawings.
Elements of the building with the largest possible cost reductions were external walls, installations, and the structural frame ͑Table 12͒. For each element, the error cost could be reduced by almost 70% of its total error cost, and all were judged to be the easiest to detect earlier. Errors in roofs and earthworks were most difficult to detect earlier, which partly explains why they were identified as having a lower cost reduction potential.
Discussion
A lack of information about the project and especially the end product may cause a lack of knowledge of how a specific task fits into the total project. This may hinder the creation of a shared mental model and may contribute to suboptimization in projects.
If there was increased emphasis on the integration of design and construction processes in projects, then errors could be eliminated, particularly design-related errors. The industry panel suggested that project managers should give all project membersclient, user, designers, site managers, and workers-an easy way to look at the final view of the project, either a scale model on the building site or a virtual model on touch screens close to where people work. All project members, especially designers and contractors, tend to complain about the time available to coordinate, plan, and inspect work ͑Tilley and McFallan 2000͒. In addition, there is often not even time for reflection. The expert panel ask for more resources, such as time and people, to improve the conditions for reacting and responding to errors. However, they concurred that the trend for shorter project durations and leaner organizations would prevail. This means that managers may have to create slack to improve processes, as they allow time for the development of individual skills and reflection. Surprisingly, many errors were left without being corrected. A number of reasons contributed to this, which included: the defect was considered to have no effect on the final product, it was too expensive, there was no time available, and correction of the work was too risky. However, a problem with not rectifying errors as soon as they are identified is that their consequences may have severe ramifications on project cost and time at a later date. In addition, taking no action may be seen as legitimizing errors, which means that individuals learn to both make and accept errors! With this in mind, the willingness to react and respond to errors may decrease.
How much do organizations need to invest in improvement activities without increasing project costs? According to industry practitioners, error costs could be reduced by as much as 62%. In some cases, they argued that the investment needed to detect a specific error earlier would cost more than the benefit of it. One of the designers explained that
The question is how much resources you should spend on inspection and cooperation during the design phase. The number of errors and the error cost should of course be reduced. But somewhere there is a limit for how time and effort you can spend on inspections. Some of the errors had probably not been significantly cheaper if you had detected them earlier. Sometimes you deliberately choose to take a chance with some parameters. Better design in this respect gives a more secure process but not necessary a lower cost. So investments should be focused on carefully selected activities. Another argument for investing in activities aimed at error detection is that it creates several more positive effects. Many errors are not detected until the building is in use. Thus, an inspection during the design phase may uncover not only obvious errors but also potential latent errors. Most investments in improvement activities create effects, which are normally not calculated but should be considered. For a detailed discussion on indirect costs associated with rework and hidden poor-quality costs, such as lost income, customer's costs, and socioeconomic costs refer to Sörqvist ͑1998͒.
In discussions with the practitioners about improvement, it was revealed that adding new activities such as new functions or roles, education or training was required, which in turn can increase administration. In this particular study, the expert panel identified 587 situations where the errors should have been detected. In every single situation the experts suggested improvements, which resulted in increased administration; developing individual characteristics, improving specific activities, establishing routines and providing resources. Increased administration would probably create increased stress, which could hinder individuals to react, respond and act on errors. It will also give less time for reflection, which is needed for both reacting on errors and learning from errors. Our experience is that practitioners as well as researchers seldom recommend firms or projects to remove activities and make processes simpler in order to reduce the number of errors.
Conclusion
Based on a major study of 2,879 human errors in seven Swedish building projects, the research presented in this paper has suggested that a thorough examination of the error-recovery process can lead to a reduction in errors occurring in projects. An examination of the most expensive errors by industry practitioners indicated that the major area of error reduction was attributed to improving communication between participants, introducing incentives, improving resourcing levels in projects particularly during design, and the encouragement of individual and organizational learning. Fundamentally, the error-recovery process must be complete to reduce the error costs and to increase learning. It includes reacting on occurred errors ͑detection͒, responding to responsible individuals or organizations ͑indication͒, and acting on the response ͑correction͒. The research revealed that several project members, independent of each other and on different occasions, should have reacted and responded to the same error. Therefore, it is suggested that managers be sure that every project member understands that they need to react, respond, and act to any error that occurs. Although this may lead to a perceived increase in administration, the costs of prevention will invariably outweigh the costs associated with attending to an error.
